Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the Titans by Losch, Jill Thompson
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 52 | Number 1
September 1991
Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of
the Titans
Jill Thompson Losch
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Jill Thompson Losch, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the Titans, 52 La. L. Rev. (1991)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol52/iss1/7
COMMENT
Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the
Titans
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Neverending Story
Once upon a time, in a faraway kingdom, several ambitious subjects
banded together to produce widgets. The dedicated group hired the
very best workers, and soon word of the marvelous widgets spread
throughout the land. Before many revolutions of the moon, the demand
for, and thus production of, widgets increased twofold. But alas, so
did the production of vile by-products. So busy were the workers in
satisfying the citizens' voracious demand for widgets that the poisonous
waste was merely collected and deposited in an earthen pit.
All was well until one day when, alerted by the noxious odor
emanating from the widget plant's grounds, the kingdom's environ-
mental custodian happened upon the ghastly (and now glowing) pit.
The widget manufacturer was immediately ordered to find a more
suitable method of disposing of the waste, one in keeping with the'
kingdom's laws regulating such matters. When the group discovered
that such compliance would virtually deplete its coffers of gold pieces,
and that the kingdom itself would undertake the clean-up if it did not,
the group sought shelter in the lenient debtor protection mechanism
known as bankruptcy.
And thus the kingdom faced a dilemma: should the group be able
to evade its environmental obligations while continuing to manufacture
widgets under the protective umbrella of bankruptcy? Or to phrase the
query in what is perhaps more appropriate terms, should the kingdom
now advance the public policy embodied in its environmental regulations
or promote the private relief afforded by bankruptcy?
Copyright 1991, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
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B. Scope of Paper
Such is the tale that unfolds today far more frequently and with
more complexity than one might imagine.' The search for a solution
begins with identification of specific conflicts between bankruptcy and
environmental hazardous waste regulations. More specifically, the pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Code2 relating to abandonment, discharge,
priority of claims, and the automatic stay have to be examined in light
of their effect on environmental obligations as set forth in the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA).3 In addition, the effect of bankruptcy on state law envi-
ronmental obligations needs to be assessed.
This paper will offer possible solutions to the problem of reconciling
the competing policies embodied in CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code.
Because the conflict cannot be resolved as long as environmental ob-
ligations are mutable inside bankruptcy, complete relief is likely to
ultimately require legislative action.
II. COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND
ILIABILITY ACT
CERCLA establishes a complicated scheme4 that enables the federal
government to respond promptly and effectively to the pervasive prob-
lems inherent in hazardous waste disposal.s Ultimately, CERCLA pro-
motes the "private allocation of responsibility" 6 for costs incurred in
I. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has estimated that during the next
50 years voluntary bankruptcy petitions will be filed by 23-30% of the owners or operators
of waste disposal facilities. U.S. General Accounting Office, Hazardous Waste, Envi-
ronmental Safeguards Jeopardized When Facilities Cease Operating 18 (1986), cited in
Note, Police and Regulatory Power v. Pecuniary Interest: The Bankrupt Hazardous
Waste Site Owner Faces the Music, 30 Nat. Resources J. 423 (1990).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1988). The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act created the
Bankruptcy Code. The Act was amended by Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222,
96 Stat. 235 (1982); the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees,
and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986);
the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat.
610 (1988); and the Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104
Stat. 2865 (1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
4. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. Law 923,
952 (1990) [hereinafter Barr).
5. See H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 6119-20.
6. Barr, supra note 4, at 1001.
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responding to threatened or actual releases, spills, or discharges of
hazardous substances7 at existing or abandoned sites by laying liability
at the feet of a broadly defined "potentially responsible party" (PRP).s
CERCLA is the first comprehensive 9 and self-executing federal stat-
ute to address the past as well as the future release of hazardous
substances. To effectuate the broad statutory mandate, CERCLA vests
the President (and thus the EPA) with extensive power.' 0 The EPA has
a continuing duty to identify sites" releasing hazardous substances. The
sites, ranked in order of priority, comprise the National Priorities List
(NPL). 12
Essentially, CERCLA provides three courses of action:
1. The government can undertake clean-up actions consisting
of removal 3 and remedial' 4 measures whenever there is a release
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) defines "hazardous substance" by reference to
substances designated hazardous or toxic under provisions of the Clean Water Act (33
U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(2)(A), 1317(a)); characteristic or listed hazardous wastes under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 6921 et seq.); hazardous' air pollutants under
the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7412); any imminently hazardous chemical substance
upon which the EPA acted under the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. § 2606);
and, finally, any other element, substance, etc. designated under CERCLA (42 U.S.C.
§ 9602). CERCLA exempts petroleum, natural gas, and synthetic gas.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) imposes liability on present owners and operators,
those who were owners and operators at the time the disposal occurred, generators
(including those who "arranged for" disposal, treatment, or transportation to disposal
or treatment), and transporters. See also T.P. Long Chem. Co., 45 Bankr. 278, 283
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (the debtor and the debtor's estate may incur liability under
CERCLA).
9. See J. Arbuckle, M. Brown, N. Bryson, W. Frick, R. Hall, J. Miller, M. Miller,
T. Sullivan, T. Vanderver & L. Wegman, Environmental Law Handbook 109 (8th ed.
1985). Also, a substance may be deemed hazardous under CERCLA despite the fact that
the substance is not considered hazardous by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 6921 et seq. (1988)).
10. Such power is obviously essential to implement "appropriate environmental re-
sponse action to protect public health and the environment from the dangers posed by
[hazardous waste] sites." H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 reprinted in
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6119.
!1. The procedure is undertaken pursuant to the National Contingency Plan (42
U.S.C. § 9605 (1988)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988). Currently, the NPL contains over 1,200 sites.
EPA National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 40 C.F.R. § 300
(1991). Additionally, while the NPL addresses only sites presenting problems of long-
term or chronic release of hazardous substances, the EPA may also order and/or
undertake itself the clean-up of sites presenting an "imminent or substantial endanger-
ment" regardless of whether these sites appear on the NPL.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) defines removal in pertinent
part as "the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment
... as may be necessary ... in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances
into the environment (and as may be) necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the
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or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant
which may present "an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare."'" Where response is consistent with
the National Contingency Plan, costs are absorbed by the Haz-
ardous Substances Superfund. 16
2. The EPA may also order abatement actions (and thus con-
serve its own resources) where an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or to the envi-
ronment exists. 7 Additionally, the EPA can assess penalties for
non-compliance."8
3. Where the government or a private party has expended funds
for cleanup, a cost recovery action may be brought against the
PRP.19 Recoverable costs include necessary response costs in-
curred by the government or by nongovernmental parties con-
sistent with the NCP, damages to natural resources and the
costs of assessing such damages, and health assessment costs
authorized under CERCLA. 20 To secure all costs and damages
for which the PRP may be liable, the statute grants the federal
government a lien on all property belonging to the PRP that
is subject to or affected by the removal or remedial action.2'
release or threat of release ... or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary
to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage."
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988) defines remedial actions as "those actions consistent
with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions."
See also S. Wolf, Pollution Law Handbook 229 (1988) wherein the author states,
"The essential difference between removal and remedial actions is that removal is directed
at immediate and necessary clean-up operations, while remedial actions are concerned
with more extensive and permanent efforts to rehabilitate the environment and repair
the damage caused by the release of hazardous substances."
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982), repealed by Act of Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, § 517(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1774 (1986) (previously known as the Hazardous Substance
Response Trust Fund). See also the reauthorization of Superfund at Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
The Superfund is financed by a tax on petroleum and chemicals, federal appropriations,
interest, and reimbursements for government clean-up costs.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988). Superfund penalties averaged $7,295 during 1989.
EPA's National Penalty Report for 1989, cited in Lavelle, Enforcement and the EPA,
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 24, 1990, at 49.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988). The lien attaches when costs are incurred by the
United States or when notice is given to the PRP, whichever occurs later, and continues
until the obligation is satisfied or the statute of limitations has run on the action.
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CERCLA liability is often termed "excessive", 2 presumably for its
imposition of joint and several liability23 without regard to negligence, 24
and subsequent provision of only limited defenses.2' Moreover, CER-
CLA has a retroactive application. 26 CERCLA's expansive liability has
in fact reached third parties in the past," including parent corporations, 28
shareholders,2 9 corporate successors,30 and lenders."
In summation, CERCLA provides an integrated scheme for the
clean-up of hazardous waste and for the imposition of costs on a
statutorily defined responsible party. CERCLA's assessment of strict
liability on a joint and several basis, its expansive definition of PRP,
its criteria for financial responsibility,32 and the flexibility it grants the
government to, as needed, either conduct the clean-up itself or order
the PRP to do so, help assure that a "deep-pocket" will ultimately be
reached.
III. BANKRUPTCY
The bankruptcy process may be best justified on the basis of its
power to stave off the circling flock of creditors who would otherwise
22. See, e.g., Lavelle, Setting Sights on Superfund, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 18, 1991, at
36.
23. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1115 (1990), adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach in holding that
damages should be apportioned only in the rare case where the defendant demonstrates
that the harm is divisible.
24. Although 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988) does not provide for strict liability in express
terms, the courts have consistently imposed CERCLA liability without a showing of
negligence. See, e.g., U.S. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1160, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1988).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988) carves out limited defenses applicable to situations
caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party
who is not an employee or agent and does not have a contractual relationship with the
defendants either directly or indirectly.
26. See, e.g., U.S. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); U.S. v. Rohm and Haas
Company, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1987).
27. For a thorough discussion of cases in this area, see Comment, The Environmental
Due Diligence Defense and Contractual Protection Devices, 49 La. L. Rev. 1405 (1989).
28. For an excellent discussion of this subject, see Barr, tupra note. 4, at 981-82.
But see Joslyn Manuf. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
I I I S. Ct. 1017 (1991) wherein the court refused to pierce the corporate veil to impose
liability under CERCLA.
29. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mirabile, 751 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
30.' See, e.g., Smith Land Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989).
31. See, e.g., U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991); U.S. v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573
(D. Md. 1986).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b) (1988).
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feast merrily on the debtor's 'carcass, with the swiftest among them
realizing the choicest cuts. 3 Thus, rather than a counterproductive free-
for-all where each creditor pursues his own self-interest to snatch what-
ever assets the debtor has remaining' 4 the Bankruptcy Code establishes
procedural mechanisms" to maximize the debtor's assets. The objectives
of bankruptcy are twofold: I) to provide the debtor with a fresh start
financially, 6 and 2) to provide the creditor with a mechanism for the
orderly distribution of the debtor's estate,3" either by liquidation ' s or
pursuant to a plan of reorganization.39
Bankruptcy may be initiated by the debtor's'4 filing of a voluntary
petition 41 or the creditor's42 commencing, under certain conditions, an
involuntary action against the debtor.43 The filing of the petition creates
certain rights and obligations. In a voluntary case, it serves as the order
for relief" and the benchmark for determining when a claim arose for
33. Essentially, bankruptcy "encourag[es] creditors and others with rights to the
debtor's assets to act as the sole owner of the assets would act." D. Baird & T. Jackson,
Cases, Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy 40 (1990) [hereinafter Baird].
34. Bankruptcy scholars refer to this phenomenon as the problem of the common
pool. An illustration given is that of a small pond, owned by no one person but instead
by a group of individuals, and brimming with fish. Although it would be in the group's
interest to set per-member quotas in an attempt to insure that fish will remain plentiful
in the future, each individual's self-interest will prevail and each will catch as many fish
as he can. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 33, at 39. In environmental law, an analogous
situation is presented by the "commons."
35. Generally, bankruptcy law is procedural. Substantive matters are regulated by
state law as long as the objectives of bankruptcy are not frustrated. See, e.g., Butner
v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S. Ct. 914 (1979) ("Property interests [in bankruptcy]
are created and defined by state law.").
36. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, 5963, 6135.
37. But see Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bank-
ruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2097, 2098
(hereinafter Bowers] wherein the author states, "[W]e do know that bankruptcy is not
working as a creditor's remedy."
38. Liquidation is a synonym for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 701-766
(1988).
39. The reorganization provisions are also known as Chapter 11 filings. See II
U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(13) (West Supp. 1991): "'[Debtor' means person or mu-
nicipality concerning which a case under this title has been commenced." In turn, §
101(41) defines "person" as including individuals, partnerships, and corporations.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). There is no prerequisite of insolvency for the filing of
a voluntary bankruptcy petition.
42. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10) (West Supp. 1991) defines creditor in pertinent part as
an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the
order for relief concerning the debtor."
43. See 1I U.S.C. § 303 (1988) for the substantive and procedural requirements that
must be satisfied before an order for relief will be ordered under an involuntary petition.
44. I1 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
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purposes of priority of payment. 45 Additionally, upon the filing of the
petition the automatic stay" takes effect, and all efforts to commence
or continue judicial or administrative actions,' 7 to enforce a prepetition
judgment against the debtor or his property,"' to create, perfect, or
enforce a lien, 49 or to attempt by any other actions to collect the debt,
are prohibited."4
The trustee is the representative of the estate." . As a fiduciary, the
trustee is charged with collecting the assets of the estate 2 in a manner
that will maximize the return to unsecured creditors. To effectuate this
purpose, the Bankruptcy Code grants the trustee the capacity to in-
validate liens" as well as preferential" or fraudulent" transfers. The
trustee may also use, sell, or lease estate property 6 and may abandon
property that is burdensome or of inconsequential value.' 7
The bankruptcy trustee pays claims" according to the priority scheme
set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. Generally, secured claims5' are granted
45. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 502 (1988) (allowance of claims), 503 (1988) (adminis-
trative expenses), and 507 (1988) (priorities).
46. 1i U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
47. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1988).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1988).
50. Other actions forbidden by § 362 are acts to obtain possession of the property;
to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor; to set off any debt; or to
commence or continue any proceeding concerning the debtor before the United States
Tax Court. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362(a)(3), (6), (7), (8) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). Willful
violations of the stay entitle the debtor to actual damages including costs, attorneys'
fees, and punitive damages. See il U.S.C.A. § 362(h) (West Supp. 1991).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1988). The Chapter 7 trustee is selected from a panel of
private trustees. In a typical Chapter 11 case, the "debtor in possession" serves in place
of the trustee.
52. The estate is broadly defined to encompass all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property at the commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988) for
a complete listing of the interests comprising the estate.
53. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545 (1988).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
55. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
58. Section 101(5) defines a claim in expansive terms as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, un-
disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis-
puted, undisputed, secured or unsecured.
!1 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West Supp. 1991).
59. Claims are secured only up to the value of the collateral. II U.S.C. § 506
(1988).
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first priority, followed by administrative claims,'6 special expenses and
claims as set forth in section 507, unsecured claims," fines, penalties,
and forfeitures,'6 and payment of legal interest.'3 Finally, in the unlikely
event any assets remain, the debtor is the recipient of these."
At the conclusion of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the individual debtor
is normally granted a discharge. 61 In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the
confirmation of the plan under section 1141 discharges the debt other
than as provided in the plan."
Because of the protective procedural mechanisms of the Bankruptcy
Code, the process provides a haven for the debtor from menacing
creditors. But the filing of the petition may disrupt business, lower the
value of the debtor's business operation, and make it difficult for the
debtor to collect on accounts receivable.67 In fact, the creditors them-
selves may benefit from their debtor's bankruptcy by achieving some
control over the debtor and competing creditors.
IV. BANKRUPTCY V. ENVIRONMENTAL ODLIGATIONS
The bankruptcy process endeavors to grant the debtor a fresh
financial start and to assure competing creditors a fair and orderly
administration of the estate. In contrast, environmental regulations in
general, and CERCLA in particular, seek to protect the public safety
and the environment despite the selfish interests of the debtor and his
creditors.
Most importantly, the Bankruptcy Code does not inquire why a
person or entity seeks bankruptcy relief." Consequently, bankruptcy
makes no distinction between the obligation to shoulder financial re-
sponsibility for clean-up costs and any other financial obligation.' 9 The
tension between the public policies embodied in environmental obli-
60. II U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
61. I1 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2), (3) (1988).
62. I U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1988).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (1988).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988). There are no provisions under Chapter 7 for the discharge
of a corporation. Such a provision is deemed unnecessary because: I) corporate share-
holders have no personal liability, and 2) state dissolution procedures are available.
66. For the requirements necessary to receive a discharge upon confirmation of the
plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
67. Baird, supra note 33, at 65.
68. Van Patten & Puetz, Bankruptcy and Environmental Obligations: The Clash





gations and the private relief offered by bankruptcy thus becomes
obvious.70
The foregoing summary admittedly oversimplifies the discord be-
tween bankruptcy and environmental obligations. However, the follow-
ing sections will further define the scope of the problem by examining
the conflict as it relates to the trustee's power of abandonment, the
automatic stay, the administrative expense priority, and the discharge
provision. Ultimately, compliance with environmental regulations must
take precedence over the protection presently offered by the Bankruptcy
Code. Hence, to the extent possible, there must be no distinction
between environmental obligations of those "potentially responsible par-
ties" who are bankrupt and those who are not.
A. Abandonment
1. The Conflict
Bankruptcy Code section 554(a) permits the trustee or the debtor
in possession to abandon property that is "burdensome" or of "in-
consequential value." 7' Undoubtedly, weighty environmental obligations
render property, pending remediation and response actions, both bur-
densome and of inconsequential value. Yet if the trustee is permitted
to abandon property before complying with clean-up obligations, the
burden of clean-up falls upon the government unless joint and several
liability enables pursuit of a solvent PRP. Additionally, abandonment
eliminates the trustee's incentive to implement even relatively inexpensive
measures such as fencing or sealing of barrels that might otherwise
mitigate harms. Surely, such a result cannot be justified by the prin-
cipally procedural mechanism of bankruptcy.
On the other hand, denial of abandonment requires the trustee to
expend estate funds on the maintenance of essentially worthless property.
This result may frustrate the "fresh start" policy of bankruptcy and
impair the trustee's role of maximizing assets for the general unsecured
creditors' benefit. It may be, however, that the narrow interests of the
debtor and creditors should remain inferior to the greater concern of
protecting the public health and safety. The court has thus struggled
70. The conflict between environmental obligations and bankruptcy is inherent in
their respective sources; the former emanates from regulatory and police power and the
latter from property law.
71. "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). The abandonment is made to any party with possessory
interest in the property abandoned.
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to place limits on the trustee's seemingly broad statutory power of
abandonment.
2. The Jurisprudence
The earliest indication of the Supreme Court's stance on the scope
of the trustee's power to abandon property pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Code appeared in dictum in Ohio v. Kovacs. 2 The Court assumed
without discussion that in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy where property is
worth less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee may evade clean-up
obligations imposed pursuant to state environmental laws by abandoning
the property to its prior owner. 7
Shortly after Kovacs was rendered, the Supreme Court squarely
faced the abandonment issue in Midatlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 74 The Court ruled that
the trustee's "absolute" power to abandon property admittedly of in-
consequential value and subject to a state court order of clean-up,71
was circumscribed by the countervailing need to protect the public health
and welfare. 76 Said the Court,
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize
an abandonment without formulating conditions that will ad-
equately protect the public's health and safety .... [A] trustee
may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute
or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public
health or safety from identified hazards."
72. 469 U.S. 274, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985). In Kovacs, the state of Ohio had effectuated
a prepetition seizure of the hazardous waste site subsequent to the failure of the Chem-
Dyne Corp. and Kovacs, its CEO, to comply with a state court judgment to remediate
hazardous conditions. Kovacs then filed for bankruptcy protection and sought discharge
of the obligation pursuant to § 554(a). The discharge was permitted.
73. Id. at 284 n.12, 105 S. Ct. at 710 n.12. The Court opined that if bankruptcy
had been filed prior to the appointment of a receiver, the trustee would determine if
the property was of value to the estate. "If the property were worth less than the cost
of cleanup, the trustee would likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to
comply with the state environmental law to the extent of his or its ability." Id.
74. 474 U.S. 494, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
75. Id. at 497, 106 S. Ct. at 757. The debtor (Quanta Resources Corporation)
processed waste at two facilities, one in New York and the other in New Jersey. The
former site contained over 70,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated oil in leaking containers,
while the latter contained more than 400,000 gallons of the PCB-laced oil. Thus, Quanta
was in violation of the environmental laws of New York and New Jersey. Quanta sought
to abandon both sites.
76. Id. at 501, 106 S. Ct. at 759. ("[A] trustee could not exercise his abandonment
power in violation of certain state and federal laws.").
77. Id. at 507, 106 S. Ct. at 762 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 52
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The five to four decision emphasized that the equitable principles
underlying the judicially created restrictions on abandonment, including
the subordination of bankruptcy to state laws intended to protect public
health and welfare, were codified in section 554.7s The Court then
tempered its holding in three ways. First, the Court pretermitted the
question of "whether certain state laws imposing conditions on aban-
donment may be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy ad-
judication itself." The remaining limitations on the trustee's section
554 abandonment power, although relegated to a footnote,"0 are the
most compelling. Second, the Court asserted that the exception to the
abandonment power vested in the trustee by section 554 does not apply
to a "speculative or indeterminate future violation."'  Third, it found
that the power to abandon is "not to be fettered by laws or regulations
not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from
imminent and identifiable harm."8 2
After Midatlantic, the courts considered whether a threat to the
public health and safety is necessary to circumscribe the trustee's power
to abandon property or whether a "mere" violation of an environmental
law designed to protect the public from "imminent and identifiable
78. Id. at 501, 106 S. Ct. at 759. The court buttressed its argument that II U.S.C.
0 554(a) (1988) codified the common law restrictions on abandonment by: I) examining
the legislative history of CERCLA, 2) examining another provision of the Bankruptcy
Code where non-bankruptcy law is pertinent, i.e. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (1983 & West
Supp. 1991) (the automatic stay) and 3) referring to 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988). The
latter, which orders the trustee or debtor in possession "to manage and operate the
property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of the
State," indicates Congressional intent that the Bankruptcy Code not preempt all state
and local laws concerning property.
But see Justice Rehnquist's dissent positing that the explicit language of 11 U.S.C. §
554(a) (1988) indicates that the trustee's power to abandon is limited only by consideration
of the property's value to the estate. Mldatlantic, 474 U.S. at 509; 106 S. Ct. at 763
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
79. Midatlantic National Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 507, 106 S. Ct. 755,
762 (1986). In re Peerless Plating, Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) held
that although denial of abandonment would force depletion of the debtor's estate in
complying with CERCLA, depletion of funds is not a condition so onerous as to interfere
with the bankruptcy adjudication.
80. Midatlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9, 106 S. Ct. at 762 n.9.
81. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 762 n.9.
82. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 762 n.9 (emphasis added). See In re FCX, Inc., 96 Bankr.
49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989), wherein the, court stated that "imminent danger" en-
compasses a situation where, although the environmental threat is not fully manifested,
"the danger is immediate in the sense that there is a present and real possibility of
public exposure to ... deadly substances if they are not removed." (emphasis in original)
This case also lends support to the proposition that the court, although giving some
deference to EPA and state environmental agency findings, will itself determine if there
is an immediate threat to public health and safety.
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harm" is enough to trigger restrictions. Under the first standard, if
imminent and identifiable harm is not present, abandonment may be
allowed despite noncompliance with CERCLA and state environmental
regulations. But where, under the second standard, the abandonment
power is deemed limited by violation of a law designed to prevent
imminent and identifiable harm, full compliance with that law would
be required prior to abandonment. Midatlantic's rationale applies to
state and federal environmental regulations, including CERCLA,13 and
has generally been interpreted as requiring a threat to the public health
and welfare s4 before limitations on abandonment power will be imposed,
rather than the stricter standard of requiring full compliance with all
environmental laws prior to abandonment.85
This pro-bankruptcy approach (for want of a better term) predom-
inates and is perhaps best illustrated by In re Oklahoma Refining Co.86
In this case, the trustee expended $275,000 in complying with environ-
mental regulations. 7 The total clean-up was projected to cost $2.5
million and require 30 years of monitoring. Ultimately, the value of
the land would not exceed $100,000.8 Noting that the trustee's sole
lack of compliance was the failure to submit a closure plan, and that
there was no "immediate and menacing harm to public health and
safety,"8 9 the court concluded it must only "take state environmental
laws and regulations into consideration" in determining whether to
permit abandonment. 90 The approach adopted seems to be one of "rea-
sonableness."9'
To require strict compliance with State environmental laws under
the facts of this case could create a bankruptcy case in perpetuity
83. In re FCX, 96 Bankr. at 54. See also In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr.
943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (abandonment denied where the release of cyanide gas
violated CERCLA and presented an immediate harm to the public).
84. In re FCX, 96 Bankr. at 54.
85. For a minority view holding that abandonment is not permitted unless there is
full compliance with environmental law unless such compliance is so onerous as to
interfere with the adjudication of the bankruptcy process, see In re Peerless Plating Co.,
70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (criticized in In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856
F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988)). In Peerless the court opined that the depletion of the estate
due to compliance with CERCLA was not onerous under Midatlantic.
86. 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). For a discussion of the case, see
Note, Abandonment of Hazardous Waste Sites in Bankruptcy, 13 U. Dayton L. Rev.
511 (1988) (hereinafter Abandonment].
87. Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. at 564. The trustee, with the consent of the
secured creditors, utilized cash collateral for this purpose.
88. Id. at 564.
89. Id. For criticism of this point, see Abandonment, supra note 86, at 517-19.
90. Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. at 565.
91. A similar standard was enunciated in In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr.
268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
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and fetter the estate to a situation without resolve. This trustee,
with consent of the secured creditors, has done what is rea-
sonable under the circumstances. To pre-empt the administration
of this estate would derogate the spirit and purpose of the
bankruptcy laws requiring prompt and effectual administration
within a limited time period.92
From the above quotation, one may surmise that one of the factors
the court will consider in future analyses is whether or not the trustee
has unencumbered assets with which to comply with the state and/or
federal regulations. Among the factors enunciated in In re Franklin
Signal Corp.9" to be considered in determining the conditions under
which the abandonment may be allowed are the amount and type of
funds available for cleanup.9 In Franklin Signal, the Fourth Circuit
allowed the trustee to abandon fourteen drums of toxic chemicals,
despite noncompliance with state environmental laws, where no "im-
minent and identifiable harm" to the public was presented and where
the estate possessed limited unencumbered funds. 9 Moreover, at least
one court has bluntly stated that "the trustee cannot be ordered to
comply with a cleanup obligation that he does not have the financial
resources to satisfy."%
92. In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986)
(citations omitted).
93. Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 268.
94. The factors enunciated by the court were: 1) the imminence of danger to the
public health and safety, 2) the extent of probable harm, 3) the amount and type of
hazardous waste, 4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental
laws, and 5) the amount and type of funds available for cleanup. Franklin Signal, 65
Bankr. at 272.
95. See also In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988) and In re FCX,
Inc., 96 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. E.D.C. 1989). In FCX, five tons of buried pesticides presented
an "immediate" threat under Midailantic, and abandonment would not be allowed unless
the trustee set aside $250,000 to pay for cleanup undertaken pursuant to state and
CERCLA regulations. The court indicated a different result might be merited where the
trustee has unencumbered funds at his disposal.
96. In re Microfab, 105 Bankr. 161, 169 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). In Microfab the
court concluded that even if the trustees expended all the estate's assets on compliance,
the cleanup would still be underfunded. Further, there was no assurance that the trustee
would thereby "significantly improve the condition of the Site." Abandonment was
permitted.
See also In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989)
(where the unencumbered assets were "far short" of the estimated cost of clean-up and
there was no evidence of imminent harm to the public, abandonment was allowed); and
In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 Bankr. 144, 147 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) ("Iln a
no-asset case ... the question is not whether the trustee must expend the assets of the
estate on compliance with the environmental laws before abandoning the property. Rather,
because the estate has no assets, the question becomes whether or not the trustee may
be required to bring the property into compliance at his own expense. In this court's
view, the trustee may not .... ") (emphasis in original).
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3. Conclusion
By its literal terms, section 554(a) speaks only of the abandonment
of property of the estate, not of the abandonment of liabilities such
as those imposed by CERCLA. In fact, abandonment of property will
not relieve the owner of liability under CERCLA any more than sale
to a third party would.98 However, to the extent compliance with
environmental laws requires maintenance of the property, fencing, seal-
ing of barrels, and other security measures, the trustee may seek to
escape such liability and conserve funds by abandonment. 99 One wonders
by what rationale property that cannot be abandoned outside bankruptcy
may be abandoned inside bankruptcy.
If the property cannot be abandoned when there is an imminent
danger to the public, and if the estate has no unencumbered assets,
who will pay for compliance? Midatlantic does not answer that question.
Thus, the query may be more aptly phrased as one of priority. Granting
an administrative expense priority for costs of compliance would absolve
the trustee of personal liability,' ® encourage the trustee to cooperate
with the environmental agencies,' 0' and protect the public from harm.
However, this feat would be accomplished at the expense of the general
unsecured creditors.
A decision must be made: is the "fresh start" policy of bankruptcy
to be subordinated to the concern for the health of humans and the
environment embodied in environmental regulations? Presently, the an-
swer appears to depend on the court, the characterization of harm,
and the presence or lack thereof of unencumbered assets. At the very
least, however, abandonment should not be allowed unless the trustee
assures the protection of the public by preventive measures such as
installation of security fencing, completion of drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing of deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive agents.1°
At most, the environmental obligations should not be protected by the
procedural mechanisms of bankruptcy.
Because there is no balance sheet insolvency requirement for a
voluntary bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, the debtor's
motives in filing a petition (including the desire to escape environmental
obligations) may result in an abuse of the bankruptcy process. Ulti-
97. See generally Baird, supra note 33, at 591.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). if abandonment is made to the debtor in a Chapter
7 bankruptcy, he will seek discharge of his personal obligations pursuant to Bankruptcy
Code § 727(a) (11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988)).
99. Baird, supra note 33, at 592.
I00. Van Patten, supra note 68, at 249.
101. Id.
102. Midatlantic National Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 499 n.3, 106 S. Ct.
755, 758 n.3 (1986).
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mately, the "fresh start" policy of bankruptcy carries too high a price
for the public. Thus, section 554(a) should be amended to prevent this
occurrence. Rather than the issue turning on the characterization of
the harm as imminent and identifiable, the focus would then be on
compliance with environmental obligations imposed pursuant to CER-
CLA and state regulations. Viewed in this light, the procedural mech-
anism of bankruptcy could exist in harmony with the substantive
requirements imposed by environmental statutes outside bankruptcy.
The suggested addition to section 554(a) is italicized:
After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any prop-
erty of the estate that is burdensome or that is of inconsequential
value and benefit to the estate, provided however that no aban-
donment be permitted unless there is substantial compliance
with 42 U.S.C. sections 9606 and 9607 [CERCLAJ and appli-
cable state environmental regulations enacted to protect the
public health and safety.
The term "substantial compliance" will allow the court to determine
if the violation is a technical one which would not merit the subor-
dination of the bankruptcy process. Furthermore, the limiting language
"enacted to protect the public health and welfare" prevents a state
legislature from concealing purely pecuniary measures in environmental
statutes.
In tandem with the above provision limiting the trustee's aban-
donment power where there is no "substantial compliance," CERCLA
section 101(20)(A), defining the "owner or operator", must be amended
to exclude the trustee expressly. Only if the trustee is absolved of
personal liability can cooperation with federal and state environmental
agencies be assured.' °0
B. The Automatic Stay
1. The Basic Problem
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code'04 is an im-
mediate and automatic consequence of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. In fact, it is this immediacy that prompts many debtors to
seek the protection of bankruptcy. 105 "The automatic stay is one of
103. See Van Patten, supra note 68, at 249. The authors state, "(If it would help]
to have someone charged with responsibility for the cleanup so that maximum cooperation
with state or federal agencies is fostered, then it would make sense to absolve the trustee
from personal liability as an owner/operator during the period of appointment."
104. II U.S.C.A. § 362 (1983 & West Supp. 1991).
105. Smillie, When Worlds Collide: The Effect of the Bankruptcy Stay on Environ-
mental Cleanup Litigation, 8 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 77, 80 (1989).
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the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.
It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors .... The au-
tomatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain cred-
itors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property.'"16
As long as the stay is in effect, t' 7 the debtor is insulated from
virtually every collection action, foreclosure attempt, or form of ha-
rassment by any entity.' 01 Any willful violation of the stay provisions
subjects the offender to actual damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and
punitive damages.' 9
The Bankruptcy Code provides several exceptions to the automatic
stay. Pertinent provisions for purposes of this paper are: 1) the exception
permitting the enforcement of actions within a governmental unit's
police or regulatory powers," *0 and 2) "the exception to the exception,"
prohibiting the enforcement of money judgments but allowing the en-
forcement of all other judgments in an action by a governmental unit
to enforce the unit's regulatory or police power."'
The rationale for prohibiting the enforcement of money judgments,
even within the context of a governmental unit's enforcement of its
police or regulatory powers, is the unfair advantage that the government
would otherwise obtain over other creditors in regard to the distribution
of the debtor's assets." 2 The legislative history is instructive on this
106. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6296.
107. The stay remains in effect until the property is no longer the property of the
estate, the case is closed or dismissed, or the court grants relief upon the showing of
cause, including a demonstration of the lack of adequate protection (see United Savings
Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 108 S. Ct.
626 (1988)), or, with respect to specific property, upon the debtor's demonstration that
the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is not necessary for an effective
Chapter Ii reorganization. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c), (d) (1983 & West Supp. 1991).
108. II U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West Supp. 1991) defines entity to include persons, estates,
trusts, governmental units, and United States trustees.
109. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(h) (West Supp. 1991). See also In re Chateaugay Corp., 112
Bankr. 526, 530 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 920 F.2d 183 (2d
Cir. 1990) (a willful violation requires only knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and a
general intent to take actions which have the effect of violating the automatic stay).
110. Ii U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988) excepts from the automatic stay "the commencement
or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power."
11. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988) is phrased in the affirmative: the filing of a petition
does not operate as a stay "of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money
judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power."
112. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6299 ("Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession
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point: "This section is intended to be given a narrow construction in
order to permit governmental units to pursue action to protect the
public health and safety and not to apply to actions by a governmental
unit to protect a pecuniary interest in the property of the debtor or
property of the estate.""' 3
The automatic stay gives rise to several issues in defining the ap-
plicability of the stay in environmental enforcement actions: 1) does
an action by the governmental unit under state environmental laws and/
or CERCLA fall within the police and regulatory exception, and 2) if
so, under what circumstances, if any, would such an action be deemed
an action to enforce a money judgment (and thus be prohibited)?"'
The jurisprudence has attempted to fill in the gap created by the
imprecise statutory language. If an action is deemed one to enforce a
money judgment,"' the court will not reach the question of whether
or not the action would otherwise be embraced by the police/regulatory
power exception to the automatic stay."16
If the initial question concerning a money judgment is answered
in the negative, the issue then turns on the characterization of the
government's action. When the state or the EPA seeks to enforce
environmental regulations by way of injunction, to assess liability, or
to recover response costs, the action is either a permissible enforcement
of police and regulatory powers or an impermissible furtherance of
pecuniary interest.
2. Judicial Interpretation
a. Distinguishing the Money Judgment: Past Injury v. Future
Harm
Shortly after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
one commentator opined that the application of the automatic stay in
defense of environmental infractions would protect the debtor from the
and control of the bankruptcy court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all
creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental unit of a money judgment
would give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.").
113. H.R. Rep. No. 595., 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 340, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5963, 6296.
114. Neither 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988) nor II U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988) is clarified
by definitional terms.
115. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 275 (3d Cir.
1984), where the court was reluctant to accept the label assigned by the governmental
unit and determined for itself if the purpose of the action was really to "achieve ...
what a money judgment was traditionally intended to accomplish and no more."
116. Clearly, a mere entry of a money judgment in favor of a governmental unit
does not violate the automatic stay. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 275.
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initiation or continuation of enforcement actions."' The enthusiasm wis
short-lived.
• The first case to confront the conflict between the automatic stay
provision and performance of environmental obligations came in the
context of an action to enforce a state environmental statute."18 In Penn
Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources.,119 the debtor
corporation had entered a prepetition consent agreement with the state
Department of Environmental Resources (DER).2 0 When the debtor
failed to comply and subsequently filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
7;,the DER sought to obtain an injunction in state court to enforce
the consent decree.
The Third Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court' 2' and held that
the state court mandatory injunction directing the debtor to perform
mining reclamation work was not an enforcement of a money judgment
and therefore was not stayed by the initiation of bankruptcy. The court
distinguished the action before it (an injunction to prevent future harm)
from an action seeking compensation for past acts. 22 The court opined,
"[I]t is unlikely that any action which seeks to prevent culpable conduct
in futuro will, in normal course, manifest itself as an action for a
money judgment, or one to enforce a money judgment."''
The test for distinguishing a money judgment, said the court, is
to look to the nature of the injuries which the challenged remedy is
intended to redress and to discern whether the plaintiff seeks compen-
sation for past harm or the prevention of future hazards.'12 Since the
payment of money would not satisfy the state court injunctive order
to backfill, complete erosion plans, seal mine openings, and so forth,
the Penn Terra court characterized the action as one clearly intended
to prevent future harm.12S
Interestingly, the debtor in Penn Terra was involved in liquidation
proceedings rather than reorganization. Because the debtor would not
117. J. Dimento, Environmental Law and American Business 158 (1986) ("[Ulse of
the Ba nkruptcy Reform Act can operate to block the effective implementation of a
mandatory injunction obtained in environmental actions.").
118. The state cases are instructive on this issue; the cases construing the automatic
stay in reference to CERCLA are sparse.
119. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
120. The debtors had agreed to a schedule for compliance with clean-up obligations.
Id. at 269.
121. The bankruptcy court was apparently persuaded by the fact that the debtor had
filed under Chapter 7 and that the mandatory injunction required the expenditure of
funds. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 277.
122. Id.
123. Id.




be operating in the future, the dispute must not have been one to force
compliance with environmental regulations addressing ongoing or future
operations.'2 6 Indeed, although the court states that the distinction is
one between past acts and future harms, the outcome of the decision
is that the debtor was required to take action to undo past harms. 27
Thus, it is likely that the court's distinction between past acts and
future harms will be of little significance when the debtor will cease
operations 28
Shortly after Penn Terra, the Supreme Court in Kovacs was pre-
sented with the issue of whether an obligation to cleanup a site pursuant
to a state court ordered injunction was a "debt" subject to discharge.' 29
In answering that question in the affirmative, the Court cited Penn
Terra with approval, but distinguished the instant case on the basis
that the debtor had been dispossessed of his property upon the ap-
pointment of a state court receiver prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. The Supreme Court ruled that the state court injunction had
in effect been converted into an obligation to pay money. 3 0
At first blush the Supreme Court decision seems to imply a pro-
debtor position with implications for the automatic stay, but the holding
is actually a very narrow one. Since the debtor had been dispossessed
in Kovacs, the only performance the state could seek from the debtor
was the payment of money. The Supreme Court stressed, "The au-
tomatic stay provision does not apply to suits to enforce the regulatory
statutes of the state, but the enforcement of such a judgment by seeking
money from the Bankrupt ... is another matter."' 3'
Thus, in Kovacs the state sought the payment of money, rather
than performance; by contrast, in Penn Terra the remedy sought was
performance rather than payment. Admittedly, because performance by
way of clean-up cannot be accomplished without the expenditure of
funds, one may argue the distinction is one without a difference.
Nevertheless, the courts have consistently held that the mere fact that
126. Baird, supra note 33, at 575.
127. Id.
128. See Van Patten, supra note 68. at 233, wherein the author states that the cases
should perhaps turn on whether the debtor is ceasing operations or reorganizing and
continuing operations. But see In re Lenz Oil Serv., Inc., 65 Bankr. 292, 297 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1986) (following Penn Terra). Despite the fact that the debtor had filed a
Chapter 7 petition and had ceased operations, the court held that a state court pre-
petition cleanup order was not subject to stay. "[T]he main purpose of the relief sought,"
said the court, "was prospective: only if the old wastes were cleaned up and new waste
deposits prevented could the potential future harm be prevented."
129. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985).
130. Id. at 283, 105 S. Ct. at 710.
131. Id. at 283 n.11, 105 S. Ct. at 710 n.11.
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the debtor must expend funds to comply with an injunction does not
transform the action into one to enforce a money judgment. 32
b. Regulatory Interest or Pecuniary Interest?
Once a court determines that an action is not one to enforce a
money judgment, one hurdle remains before the action can proceed:
is the action to be enforced a valid exercise of the government's police
or regulatory power under section 362(b)(4)? The police and regulatory
power exception to the automatic stay does not grant the government
plenary power to enforce environmental regulations. Rather, the leg-
islative history' and jurisprudence indicate that the exception is ap-
plicable only where the government seeks to protect the public and the
environment from harm.
However, it is not necessary for the government to show imminent
and identifiable harm or urgent public necessity to override the auto-
matic stay provision. 34 Nor may a debtor successfully argue that the
police and regulatory exception applies only to a governmental unit
enforcing its own laws.' Certainly, laws intending to rectify environ-
mental harm are within the ambit of the exception. 36 Moreover, CER-
132. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources 733 F.2d 267, 278 (3d
Cir. 1984) ("[Allmost everything costs something. An injunction which does not compel
some expenditure or loss of monies may often be an effective nullity."). See also In re
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1005, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) (Despite the fact that the debtor would have to spend
funds to comply with an order to submit a permitting application and closure plans
pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the action was not
one to enforce a money judgment and thus was not subject to the automatic stay.).
133. "[Wlhere a g6vernment unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of
fraud, environmental protection ... or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting
to fix damages for violation of such law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under
the automatic stay." S. Rep. No. 95-989. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5838; H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6299, cited in'Penn Terra,
733 F.2d at 272.
134. In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1184 (5th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987). Cf. Midatlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986). (imminent harm required to override
abandonment power under Bankruptcy Code § 554(a), 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988)).
135. See, e.g., People of Illinois v. Elec. Util., 41 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1984) ("The legislative history (of § 362(b)(4)) draws no distinction between a state suing
under state law and one suing under federal law." The court held that the state could
thus sue to enforce the Toxic Substances Control Act without violating the automatic
stay.).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988) (action to
fix liability under CERCLA was a valid exercise of the government's police and regulatory
power); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1984)
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CLA has achieved virtually per se status as a regulatory measure."'
In United States v. Nicolet, 138 the Third Circuit allowed an action
assessing liability under CERCLA section 107 to proceed against the
debtor, despite the fact that the judgment, if rendered, could not be
enforced because of the bar raised by Bankruptcy Code section 362(b)(5).
Nicolet had filed a petition under Chapter 11 shortly after the EPA
initiated suit pursuant to CERCLA to recover more than $1 million in
costs already expended and to obtain reimbursement for the future costs
incurred in cleanup of an asbestos site. Nicolet argued unsuccessfully
that the action was a prohibited one which allowed the government to
pursue its pecuniary interest. Despite the fact that the site no longer
posed a threat to the public, the action to assess liability was deemed
a valid exercise of regulatory power and was excepted from the au-
tomatic stay.
Under the Penn Terra past act-future harm dichotomy, the action
should have been barred; clearly the remedy sought was compensation
for past acts, at least insofar as recovery for funds already expended
was concerned. The court, however, announced a sweeping conclusion
that the legislative history of section 362,'19 along with CERCLA's
regulatory and deterrence functions,' ° reveal that CERCLA actions up
to and including the entry of a money judgment are not pecuniary in
nature. CERCLA actions are thus encompassed within the police or
regulatory exception to the automatic stay.' 4'
United States v. Mattiace42 presented facts similar to those in
Nicolet. After the EPA expended $1 million to clean-up the company's
waste site pursuant to CERCLA, the company filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11. All parties agreed that injunctive relief and imposition
of fines were clearly permitted by section 362(b)(4).' 41 The court made
short work of the debtor's argument that the action to recover response
costs previously incurred as well as punitive damages was not a valid
exercise of regulatory power, but rather an impermissible pursuit of
pecuniary interest.
The court stated:
("No more obvious exercise of the State's power to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public (than the DER's injunction) can be imagined."); United States v.
Mattiace Indus. Inc., 73 Bankr. 816, 819 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1987) ("CERCLA . . . was
clearly enacted to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public.").
137. Mattiace, 73 Bankr. at 819.
138. 857 F.2d at 202.
139. Id. at 207.
140. Id. at 209, citing H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in
1980 U.S. Code Cong, & Admin. News 6119.
141. United States v; Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
142. 73 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1987).
143. Id. at 818.
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
(Gjovernment actions under CERCLA, whether for injunctive
relief or for recovery costs, damages, and penalties, are brought
pursuant to a statute that was clearly enacted to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the public .... Even where the
United States seeks punitive damages or reimbursement of Su-
perfund cleanup costs in addition to or in lieu of injunctive
relief, ... the deterrence function of the relief sought will
render the action one to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare (and therefore within the section 362(b)(4) exception).'"
After Mattiace and Nicolet, it would appear that actions under
CERCLA sections 104, 106, and 107 fall within the 362(b)(4) exception.
It is likely that the rationale of these two cases will be followed and
will prevent the automatic stay from being used as a shield by otherwise
solvent corporations seeking to escape environmental obligations. As
long as the government does not attempt to enforce any judgment
regarding the fixing of liability against the debtor, the court will not
inquire into whether the action falls within the exception to the exception
of 362(b)(5). This result may subordinate private relief to public policy,
but such is the nature of cost allocation; those who reap the benefits
from the debtor's operations should bear the risks.
3. Conclusion
The automatic stay provision generally protects both the debtor and
the creditor; the former is protected through the provision of "breathing
room" and the latter through the assurance that the debtor's assets
will not be parceled out based on the results of an inequitable race.
However, its application to environmental obligations is not easily re-
solved.
The jurisprudence indicates that the automatic stay is virtually use-
less in the face of CERCLA actions to enforce clean-up mandates or
to assess liability. CERCLA has been deemed regulatory in nature,
regardless of whether the action in question is one to enforce an
injunction, assess liability, or assess fines. The regulatory nature, cou-
pled with the deterrence function, renders every act up to and including
the entry of a money judgment, the provision of injunctive relief,"15
the imposition of fines and penalties, or the initiation of an action to
assess liability for reimbursement of clean-up funds expended by the
government on behalf of the debtor'" within section 362(b)(4) and
outside of section 362(b)(5). However, it is also clear that the EPA
144. Id. at 819 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1988).
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may not enforce any judgment awarded in its favor without returning
to the bankruptcy court and requesting further relief from the automatic
stay.
Enforcement of state environmental laws when bankruptcy is a
factor fares similarly. Here, the court will perform a two step analysis
to determine first if the action is one to enforce a money judgment,
and if it is not, whether the action is a permissible exercise of regulatory
power or a prohibited pursuit of.pecuniary interest.
The action will not be deemed a money judgment if the debtor
has not been dispossessed of his property and if only injunctive relief
is sought. If the analysis proceeds to the second issue, the court focuses
on the primary purpose of the action. Some courts apply the "pecuniary
interest test" when assessing whether the matter is related to the pro-
tection of the state's pecuniary interest or to matters of public policy,
while other courts focus on whether the proceeding adjudicates private
rights or public policy."
An examination of the legislative purposes underlying sections
362(b)(4) and (5) reveals that the provisions were intended to allow the
government access to the courts to enforce environmental laws and
regulations despite the existence of a bankruptcy proceeding."48 As a
result of Penn Terra, in a Chapter 7 liquidation where an injunctive
action proceeds, the government has what is in essence a first claim
to the remaining funds. Thus, when the pie is divided among the debtor's
prepetition creditors, they will find themselves farther down the "serv-
ing" line than they would otherwise be.
But, if laws should work inside bankruptcy as -they do outside
bankruptcy, the government is in essence "bootstrapping" itself into a
position in bankruptcy that it would not enjoy outside bankruptcy.
Outside bankruptcy, the federal government's lien on the property under
CERCLA section 107(1) is inferior to any previously perfected security
interests under state law. In bankruptcy, the government gets first claim
to the funds. If this discrepancy is objectionable, it is less so than the
debtor's ability to evade environmental obligations imposed outside
147. See In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1988), wherein the
court discusses the two approaches and states that under either, where the. state seeks
to collect a debt or compensation for reclamation work it has already performed, the.
action is stayed. However, the action under consideration-one to fix civil liability and
damages for violation of a state environmental law-was not stayed.
148. Donovan v.. TMC Indus. Ltd., 20 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (gov-
ernment was permitted to enforce minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act despite the debtor's bankruptcy; the court said Ii U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988) was
"intended to give the government a super-priority, not a priority to proceeds from the
estate, but a priority in terms of having access to any court to enforce laws which
promote public health and welfare.").
19911
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
bankruptcy by invoking procedural protections such as the automatic
stay inside bankruptcy.
Again, the issue boils down to policy. From the government's
viewpoint, if environmental actions are stayed, the public health and
the environment may be jeopardized while the government waits for
the stay to be lifted or terminated. The delay in assessing liability and
in enforcing an injunction might diminish the likelihood of recovery.
Furthermore, delay may require the EPA to dip into Superfund with
more frequency, thereby taxing an already dwindling resource. Addi-
tionally, the delay may lead the government to attempt to act before
the PRP declares bankruptcy. Once again, earlier intervention' 49 may
mean a further depletion of Superfund.
From the debtor's and his creditor's points of view, if environmental
actions are stayed, assets can be channeled into business operations,
and the Chapter I1 debtor's prospect of successful reorganization is
improved. Otherwise, the debtor may be forced to spend his remaining
funds on compliance with a CERCLA section 106 abatement action or
in defending himself against a section 107 cost recovery action.
Conversely, permitting an environmental enforcement exception to
the automatic stay makes it more likely that the cost of clean-up will
be borne by the responsible party or at least by those who benefitted
from the debtor's operations, rather than by the public. Since a choice
must be made, it is the public's interest that should prevail over the
competing creditors' interests.
A preferable way to view this dilemma reconciles the competing
values of environmental obligations and bankruptcy protections: the
debtor should be held to the same obligations in bankruptcy vis-a-vis
environmental regulations as he would be outside bankruptcy. If the
debtor cannot operate his business outside bankruptcy without com-
pliance with state and federal environmental laws, neither should he
be able to do so in bankruptcy,'" whether the proceeding is in Chapter
7 or Chapter 1I .Bankruptcy was conceived as a procedural mechanism
and was "not designed to change the value of substantive rights."''
If one agrees that bankruptcy is procedural rather than substantive,
and that one must look outside bankruptcy to determine substantive
rights and duties, there is then no real conflict between bankruptcy's
private relief and the public policy of environmental regulation. More-
over, this approach incorporates the philosophy of cost-internalization:
149. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
150. See Van Patten, supra note 68, at 233 ("Debtors ought not to be able to preserve
their own economic viability through continuing noncompliance with state and federal
environmental laws.") (footnote omitted).
151. Baird, supra note 33, at 574.
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those who benefit should bear the costs. If made aware that bankruptcy
will not provide the desired shelter, corporate America may better plan
to meet its environmental obligations through cooperation with state
and federal officials, the restructuring of pricing systems so as to pass
on costs, the purchase of insurance, or the initiation of environmental
management programs.
Although the most recent pronouncements from the circuits deem
CERCLA regulatory in nature and thus outside the automatic stay, the
Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on the issue. Thus, an amend-
ment to section 362(b) is needed to assure consistency in results, and
to build into the procedural protection of bankruptcy a recognition of
the substantive requirements of environmental regulations. The bank-
ruptcy judge will then be forced to look outside the confines of bank-
ruptcy law when dealing with substantive matters.
The suggested language of the amendment is as follows: an action
by a governmental unit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 9604, 9606, or
9607 [CERCLAJ, or by a state under similar environmental regulations,
up to and including the entry of a money judgment [is not subject to
the automatic stay provision).
If the statute is amended, abatement actions and clean-ups can
proceed, and the issue of whether or not compliance requires the
expenditure of funds will not arise. However, where the action is under
CERCLA section 104 and the government then seeks reimbursement,
the amended provision would still not allow the enforcement of the
judgment without returning to the bankruptcy court. Instead, the issue
concerns the priority of payment.
C. Administrative Expense Priority
1. An Explanation
The third area where environmental obligations and bankruptcy
policy potentially clash exists in the Bankruptcy Code's scheme for the
prioritization of creditors' claims. Whether the obligation is deemed
prepetition, and thus paid pursuant to classification as a general un-
secured claim, or whether it is considered postpetition and thus entitled
to administrative expense priority, is obviously a crucial issue.5 2 The
priority scheme not only determines who is entitled to a slice of the




pie' but also into how many slices the pie will be cut and in which
order the pieces will be distributed.' 54
Secured claimants are entitled to first priority status up to the value
of the collateral securing their claim.'" Next come the administrative
expense priorities as set forth in section 503; section 503(b)(I)(A) pro-
vides for the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate. Finally, the remaining claims are satisfied.5 6
Only after each layer of administrative expenses is satisfied in full
do assets trickle down to the general unsecured creditor. It is easy to
grasp the impact of designating a multimillion dollar environmental
claim as an administrative expense.' 57
What expenditures qualify as "actual necessary costs and expenses
of preserving the estate" such that the claimant is accorded adminis-
trative expense priority? Clearly, expenditures such as guard services,
insurance, bookkeeping, deliveries, rent, and license fees constitute ad-
ministrative expenses."' s The rationale is that these expenses arise in a
transaction with the debtor in possession and, most importantly, are
beneficial to the debtor in possession in the operation of the business.5 9
Employing the preceding rationale, a majority of courts have designated
claims for clean-up costs as necessary and actual to the preservation
of the estate and therefore administrative expenses.
2. The Jurisprudence
The cases generally fall into one of two categories. The minority
view denies administrative priority and perceives clean-up obligations
as based on prepetition conduct, compensatory in nature, and without
benefit to the estate. 60 The majority approach grants administrative
153. See supra note 58 for the broad definition of "claim." The debtor may not
defeat a creditor by simply alleging that the debtor's extent of liability is unknown.
154. An administrative expense priority must be provided for in the plan, must be
paid on the effective date of the plan, and is nondischargeable. I I U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A)
(1988).
155. I U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 506(d) (1988). A creditor also is deemed secured to the
extent of the amount of setoff.
156. The remaining claims are paid according to the order established by Ii U.S.C.
§ 507 (1988). Thus, after the satisfaction of secured claims and administrative expenses,
the order of priority is as follows: involuntary case gap claims, specified wages, employee
benefit contributions, grain farmers' and fishermen's claims, consumer deposits or lay-
aways, and taxes.
157. The issue is important in a Chapter 7 proceeding in case there are any encumbered
assets, and in a Chapter 11 proceeding because operations are ongoing.
158. Cowans, supra note 152, at 557.
159. See Cowans, supra note 152, at 557 and the cases discussed therein.
160. See, e.g., In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); So. Ry. v. Johnson
Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985).
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expense priority on the rationale that since compliance with environ-
mental laws is a prerequisite to abandonment, the costs expended in
achieving compliance and in ultimately assuring the public health are
a necessary cost of preserving the estate.' 6'
The minority view has been notably represented. In In re Dant &
Russell, Inc.," 2 the Ninth Circuit held that the lessor of a contaminated
site was not entitled to an administrative expense priority for the pre-
petition and postpetition costs it expended on behalf of the lessee/
debtor"63 in compliance with state environmental laws and CERCLA.
The lessor had spent $250,000 to mitigate the dangerous conditions on
the site pursuant to an agreement with the EPA. Because the debtor's
assets were $3 million and the estimated costs of clean-up were $10 to
30 million, the court noted that granting administrative priority would
"wipe out the claims of all nonpreferred creditors."' The court re-
luctantly held that where costs are expended with no corresponding
benefit to the estate, and where damages occur during the prepetition
period, the claim is merely compensatory in nature and is not entitled
to administrative expense priority.'16
Although (the lessor/owner) asserts that public policy consid-
erations entitle its claim for cleanup costs to administrative
expense priority, we acknowledge that Congress alone fixes
priorities .... [U]ntil the (state) legislature enacts such pro-
tective provision or until Congress amends sections 503 and 507
to give priority to claims for cleanup costs, we are without
authority to create such a priority.'"
The Sixth Circuit rendered a contrary holding in the often cited In
re Wall Tube & Metal Production Co. .67 In this case, the state of
Tennessee was granted administrative expense priority in a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding for both prepetition inspection and testing ex-
penditures incurred pursuant to a state environmental statute and re-
covery of response costs pursuant to CERCLA section 107.161 In so
161. See, e.g., In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Inc., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987);
In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In re Stevens, 68
Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc., 65 Bankr. 521
(N.D. W. Va. 1986); In re T.P. Long Chem. Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
162. 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
163. The lessor/owner argued that it was entitled to an administrative expense priority
because it was jointly liable under § 101(21) of CERCLA.
164., Dant, 853 F.2d at 703.
165. Id. at 709. Cf. In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987), wherein
the court held that the benefit to the creditor was the abatement of danger to the public.
166. Dant, 853 F.2d at 709. The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in So.
Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985).
167. 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
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deciding, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Court' 69 and held
that since the existence at the site of an imminent and identifiable harm
to the public would have prevented abandonment by the trustee,7 0 the
cost of abating the harm was entitled to administrative priority. 7 '
[I]f the Wall Tube trustee could not have abandoned the estate
in contravention of the State's environmental law, neither then
should he have maintained or possessed the estate in continuous
violation of that same law. Otherwise, the result avoided in
Midatlantic would (and in this case did) remain an ongoing
potentially disastrous health hazard without remedy from those
at fault. The only difference here is that the danger arose
because of the trustee's and the debtor's failure to correct the
violation, not because of the trustee's abandonment power as
in Midatlantic. We find that difference unpersuasive .. . .
The minority view looks to the date of the conduct causing the
harm as the crucial event, while the majority view focuses on the date
the costs were incurred, regardless of when the damage occurred.' 3 The
issue also turns on the reading given to Midatlantic. The minority reads
the case narrowly 74 while the majority reads broadly the limit that
Midatlantic places on the trustee vis-a-vis abandonment.' Certainly, it
is the latter view which is beneficial to the government; since the cleanup
order itself may provoke the filing of the petition, the expenditures
will be deemed postpetition.
The more recent cases generally allow administrative expense priority
for the actual costs of clean-up which are necessary to prevent future
169. In re Wall Tube and Metal Products Co., 56 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986).
170. Wall Tube & Metal, 831 F.2d at 122. For this proposition, the court cited and
discussed Midatlantic National Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
171. The court also cited 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988), which provides that the "trustee
... including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his
possession ... according to the requirements of the valid -laws of the State in which
such property is situated."
172. In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987) (emphasis
in original).
173. See generally Massin, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of
Hazardous Waste, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10427 (1987).
174. See, e.g., In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988) and In re Smith-
Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988), both holding that the limit placed on the
trustee's abandonment powers under Midatlantic is narrow. Both cases cited in In re
FCX, Inc., 96 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1989).
175. See, e.g., Wall Tube & Metal, 831 F.2d at 118; FCX, 96 Bankr. at 49; In re
Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr.
943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
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harm. 76 Thus, administrative expense priority has been granted to a
purchaser (a PRP) for past and future response costs undertaken pur-
suant to CERCLA;" to the state where such action was necessary to
protect the public from "imminent and identifiable danger;' 7'' and to
the state for postpetition clean-up costs and civil penalties assessed for
prepetition activity.'7 9
The courts, however, have not allowed all costs expended on clean-
up to enjoy such priority. Rather, the administrative expense has been
limited to clean-up costs that were necessary to abate the immediate
threat to the public."80
In view of the foregoing, the issue should perhaps be phrased as
one of characterization. "The outcome turns on whether the court
characterizes the threat as an imminent or immediate threat to the
public health and safety a characterization that depends entirely on the
views of the court in the particular jurisdiction.""'
3. Conclusion
One rationale for the administrative expense provision is that the
costs expended in keeping the debtor in operation are incurred in the
collective interest of the general unsecured creditors. After all, if the
debtor remains operational, the size of the pie may increase, ultimately
benefitting the unsecured creditors." 2 Furthermore, if the debtor must
comply with environmental regulations outside bankruptcy to remain
176. Cf. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 88 S. Ct. 1759 (1968). In Reading,
the tort victim's claim arose during the bankruptcy proceeding and was thus entitled to
administrative expense priority. If the claim had arisen prepetition, he would have been
a mere general unsecured creditor. If the event had occurred after the completion of
the proceeding, he would have been entitled to payment in full.
177. In re Hemingway Transport Inc., 73 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (Al-
though the waste was dumped prepetition, the cause of action under CERCLA arose
postpetition when the property was conveyed to the purchaser or when the purchaser
expended funds for clean-up.).
178. In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987).
179. In re Chateaugay, 112 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990).
180. See, e.g., In re FCX, Inc., 96 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1989) (North
Carolina and the EPA were accorded priority status for funds expended in abating the
immediate threat to the public from five tons of buried pesticides.). The courts have
imposed one further requirement: the funds must be expended, at least in part, prior
to the application for administration expense priority. United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103 (D. N.J. 1983).
181. Note, International Environmental Bankruptcy, 23 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 345,
362 (1990).
182. See Baird, supra note 33, at 698. But see In re Vernon Sand & Gravel, Inc.,
93 Bankr. 580, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) in which the court held that the effect of
granting an administrative expense priority for reclamation work on the debtor's business
operations was "irrelevant" in deciding whether the priority status was proper.
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in operation, compliance should not be altered by the mere filing of
the bankruptcy petition. The costs should be borne both inside and
outside bankruptcy by those who benefit from the operation of the
business.
If one views compliance with environmental obligations as a cost
of doing business, one would agree that such obligations ought to
receive an administrative expense priority. Likewise, if one believes that
the purpose of bankruptcy is to assure fairness among similarly situated
creditors, one would also agree that environmental obligations that arise
prepetition should not be granted an administrative expense, in spite
of the fact that costs of compliance are not incurred until postpetition.
Once again an impasse is reached, and a policy decision must be made.
And again, the Bankruptcy Code must give way to the public's safety,
at least where the clean-up is undertaken to abate an imminent and
identifiable harm. 1 '
Another more subtle rationale exists for granting clean-up costs an
administrative expense priority: before clean-up, the contaminated prop-
erty has a negative value; after clean-up, the original value is restored
at the government's expense. Furthermore, since property cannot be
abandoned where there is a violation of an environmental law designed
to protect the public health and safety, it cannot be possessed or
maintained in violation of those laws. Utilizing this approach, the courts
have been willing to subordinate the bankruptcy policy of treating
similarly situated parties alike to assure that the responsible party, rather
than the public, bears the cost of environmental wrongdoing.
The resulting impairment of the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme
.extracts some measure of costs. Postpetition creditors, who supply goods
and services to the Chapter 11 debtor and are thus entitled to share
pro rata if administrative expenses exceed available funds, may be less
eager to provide the services the debtor in possession requires to stay
in business.184 In an extreme case, the reorganization may fail, forcing
conversion to Chapter 7 proceedings. Despite such ominous possibilities,
noncompliance with environmental obligations is far more alarming.
The impetus for legislative reconciliation is apparent. The amended
version of Bankruptcy Code section 503 would add the following ital-
icized words to the present list of administrative expenses: "the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages,
salaries, or commissions rendered after commencement of the estate,
183. See also In re Stevens. 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987), citing Pierce
Coal and Constr. Inc., 65 Bankr. 521, 531 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986) ("[ln some
circumstances the priorities of the Bankruptcy Code must give way to laws designed to
protect the public health and safety.").
184. See Abandonment, supra note 86, at 523.
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and reasonable costs expended in compliance with 42 U.s.C. sections
9606 and 9607 (CERCLAJ and applicable state environmental regula-
tions. Because the circuits are not in agreement regarding resolution of
this issue, the amendment would assure uniform treatment. Additionally,
the bankruptcy court would be required to look beyond the Bankruptcy
Code to determine substantive rights and duties.
Although the provision would elevate the government's cost recovery
action to priority status at the expense of general unsecured creditors,
it may be justified in that, at least in a Chapter 11 reorganization,
those who benefit from the continued operation of the debtor are the
ones who should bear the costs and risk of operations." 5 Although
CERCLA is intended to remediate past harms, until the violator/debtor
has complied with its mandate, a "continuing offense" occurs, and the
risk appropriately falls upon the creditors.
The government is granted a lien for prepetition judgments under
CERCLA section 107.'" Presently, the lien is of little practical signif-
icance in bankruptcy because it is inferior to all security interests
previously perfected under state law. To remedy the situation, CERCLA
section 107(1) must be amended to provide a "superlien" for the costs
of removal or remedial actions which takes priority over even previously
perfected state liens." 7 Several states have already enacted similar pro-
visions.' Because the superlien would "pass through" bankruptcy,"s9
the government would be first in line when the "pie" that is the debtor's
estate is sliced and served. If the amount of the superlien is limited
to the amount which the clean-up benefits the property, rather than
to the full cost of expenditures, the trustee is no worse off than he is
without the superlien. Since the trustee could not abandon the property
without compliance with the environmental obligations, and since no
one would purchase property having a negative value, the estate which
lacks unencumbered assets to finance the clean-up would be'at an
impasse. If the government expends its own funds and then seeks
reimbursement, the property enjoys a positive value and may be sold
by the trustee: The trustee and the general unsecured creditors are no
185. This is not a novel approach., In Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 88 S.
Ct. 1759 (1968), Justice Harlan opined that the claim of a postpetition tort victim was
a cost of keeping the debtor's business operational. He stated. "Existing creditors are,
to be sure, in a dilemma not of their own making, but there is no obvious reason why
they should be allowed to attempt to escape that dilemma at the risk of posing it on
others (tort victims] equally innocent."
186. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
187. A bill which would have created such a superlien status was defeated in 1983.
See H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
188. See Eppling, Environmental Liens in Bankruptcy, 44 Bus. Law. 85 (1988).
189. II U.S.C. § 506(d)(2) (1988).
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worse off, and the government's position is improved to the extent it
has benefitted the property.
Since all actions to perfect liens are stayed under section 362 upon
filing of the petition, the superlien will only be relevant where it is
perfected prior to the filing. Moreover, the superlien would not be
applicable unless the government conducted the cleanup itself, rather
than ordering the violator to do so. Although the superlien would go
a long way toward solving the conflict between bankruptcy and envi-
ronmental obligations, it is not a panacea. The measures discussed in




The discharge provisions' "fresh start" policy is the siren that lures
many debtors into filing for bankruptcy.' 91 The provisions differ de-
pending on whether the debtor has filed under Chapter 7 or 11.
In a Chapter 7 case, obligations of the individual debtor are dis-
charged pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 727(a). 92 Environmental
debts resulting from willful or malicious injury or imposed through
fines remain nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code section 523.193
In a Chapter. 11 case, the discharge provision, perhaps more aptly
termed a restructuring provision, is in section 1141(a). Unless the plan
provides otherwise, the debt is discharged. For purposes of this paper,
a claim' 4 is discharged under Chapter 7 to the extent it arose before
the filing of the petition'"1 and under Chapter 11 if it arose before the
190. Discharge is to be distinguished from abandonment. The former affects personal
obligations whereas the latter addresses obligations that run with the property.
191. See Baird, supra note 33, at 749, wherein the author states, "The ability of
individuals to discharge existing debts probably also explains why there are so many
bankruptcy cases each year."
192. Corporate debtors are not granted a discharge in a Chapter 7 case as their
interests are deemed adequately protected by state liquidation procedures. See supra note
65 and accompanying text.
193. i U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988): discharge is denied "for willful and malicious
injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity"; 1i U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(7) (1988): discharge is denied "to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not com-
pensation for actual pecuniary loss."
194. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 705 (1985), defining an obligation
to comply with a state court injunction as a pecuniary interest, i.e. a "claim." Hence,
it was dischargeable in bankruptcy. See supra note 58 for the definition of claim.
195. Postpetition debts may qualify as administrative expenses. For discussion see
supra section IV, subsection C.
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confirmation of the plan. This discharge affects all creditors except
those with secured status, whether or not a proof of claim is filed.'"
2. Pecuniary v. Nonpecuniary Obligation
As with the automatic stay provision, the case law interpreting the
meaning of the term "discharge" as it relates to environmental obli-
gations focuses on whether or not the claim is characterized as a money
judgment.' 9' Since Kovacs'" has been discussed at length previously in
this paper,'" mention of it here is abbreviated. The significance of
Kovacs was the Court's finding that the appointment of a receiver
necessarily limited the Chapter 7 individual debtor's obligation under
a state court ordered injunction ordering clean-up to the payment of
money. Since the obligation was a prepetition "claim," it was dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy.
Further illumination on this subject is found in United States v.
Whizco" ° where the Sixth Circuit distinguished the receivership issue
in Kovacs and ignored the Penn Terra distinction between cost recovery
and injunction relief. The individual debtor and several mine companies
for which he served in an executive capacity were in violation of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). 0' The federal
government ordered reclamation to abate damage at one of the sites.
The individual debtor then filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, and
subsequently the district court held that the injunction was a debt
dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The Sixth Circuit found that only part of the obligation was subject
to discharge. To the extent that the debtor could comply with the
injunction only by the payment of money, the obligation was a claim
dischargeable in bankruptcy.02z But to the extent the debtor could comply
without spending money, the injunction did not give rise to a right to
196. 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1988).
197. See, e.g.. In re Commonwealth Oil Refining, Inc., 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987). (The Chapter It debtor's
obligation to submit a "part B" application under RCRA and to submit a plan of
closure was nonpecuniary and thus not subject to the automatic stay.).
198. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 274, 105 S. Ct. at 705.
199. See supra sections IV, subsections A and B.
200. 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
201. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982). The reasoning of the case concerning the ap-
plicability of the discharge provision to injunctive relief should also apply in cases
construing hazardous waste laws. Massin, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy and the
Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10427, 10429 (1987).
202. Whizco, 841 F.2d at 150.
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payments and therefore was not dischargeable. "03 "To the extent [the
debtor] can act personally, he is not discharged." 2 °4
The court was unable to reconcile the conflicting policies of bank-
ruptcy law and environmental obligations and reluctantly chose to favor
the former °s In reaching this result, 1 6 the court distinguished a mon-
etary from a nonmonetary obligation, but ignored the Penn Terra
distinction between past acts and future harm. If the Penn Terra di-
chotomy had been utilized in Whizco, the court may have characterized
the obligation. to reclaim the land as one to prevent future harm. If
so, the obligation would be nonpecuniary, and consequently nondis-
chargeable, despite the fact that it would require the expenditure of
funds.207
The Penn Terra dichotomy, although suffering from its own im-
perfections,20 s is preferable to the Whizco monetary-nonmonetary dis-
tinction. It is easily agreed that a debtor must comply with environmental
laws so long as it remains in business.209 One could argue that an
abatement order, obviously directed to future operations, is not a claim
for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and is thus not subject to dis-
charge.2 10
203. Id. at 151.
204. Id. The court indicated that if the debtor obtained equipment in the future and
reengaged in mining operations, the obligation would be held nondischargeable to the
extent he could comply with ,the injunction without spending money.
Notably, however, at the time of the decision the debtor was 63 years old, owned
only limited exempt property, and his only income was Social Security. Compliance was
practically "impossible." Note, United States v. Whizco, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 207, 222
(1990).
205. United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147, 151 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988). "We are not
unmindful of the policy problems of allowing a mine operator to discharge his obligation
to reclaim his mine. However, policy decisions are the responsibility of Congress, which
could easily modify the Bankruptcy Code so that the debtor may not discharge his
obligations to reclaim the environment."
206. For a similar result, see In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985),
rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Robinson, 55 Bankr. 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985) (because a remedial order to restore the marshlands would require an expenditure
of money, the debt was pecuniary and therefore dischargeable).
207. See generally, Zabaraukas, Bankruptcy Law: Toxic Bankruptcy and Life After
Kovacs and Midatlantic, 1987 Ann. Surv. Am. L., 749, 763 (1988). The author presents
a persuasive argument that Whizco led to a "strategy of delay." Since injunctions are
not subject to the automatic stay (by virtue of Penn Terra) where the judgment is entered
against the Chapter I I debtor during the bankruptcy case, compliance would be necessary.
However, says the author, under Whizco, if the judgment is not entered until ofter
confirmation of the plan, the injunctive relief would require the expenditure of post-
discharge funds. Consequently, it would be considered a claim which was discharged.
208. See infra section IV, subsection B.
209. Baird, supra note 33, at 769.
210. Id. at 771.
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3. Prepetition v. Postpetition Claims
Whether a claim is characterized as prepetition, and thus subject
to discharge, or postpetition, and thus subject to an administrative
expense priority, is a simple matter where the creditor is an accident
victim or business person who voluntarily or involuntarily dealt with
the debtor. Much more difficult is the task of pinpointing when the
obligation under CERCLA or state environmental laws arises for pur-
poses of determining dischargeability in bankruptcy.
The most recent pronouncement on this subject came in the context
of a declaratory judgment action. The court in In re Chateaugay Corp.2"
established a clear cut rule: unless a prepetition event, described as a
release or threatened release of hazardous waste, occurs prior to the
filing of the petition, any subsequent liability under CERCLA would
not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.212 Further, if the release or threat-
ened release did occur prior to bankruptcy, the government would not
prevail on any argument that the claim was not "ripe" and therefore
not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless the EPA took actual action
prepetition.21' The key then, under Chateaugay, is not the date the
EPA acts, but rather the date the release or threatened release occurs.214
4. Conclusion
To be dischargeable in bankruptcy, the obligation must be deemed
pecuniary and prepetition. To be deemed nondischargeable, the debt
must be either nonpecuniary or postpetition. After Whizco, the debtor
may have an incentive to delay the 'enforcement action. Since the court
decided the issue of dischargeability on the basis of pecuniary versus
nonpecuniary performance, rather than looking to the Penn Terra di-
chotomy of past act versus future harm, any order entered after the
conclusion of the bankruptcy will be deemed discharged to the extent
it requires the expenditure of postpetition funds.
A second difficulty in discharge concerns classifying the claim as
prepetition or postpetition. The courts have held that the claim is deemed
to arise prepetition whenever the release or threatened release occurred
prior to bankruptcy, regardless of when the EPA attempted to enforce
its duty under CERCLA. If the release is discovered postpetition, but
occurred prepetition, the obligation may be dischargeable to the extent
211. 112 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990).
212. Id. at 521.
213. Id. at 522.
214. The court did acknowledge, however, that injunctive relief which carries with
it no right of payment for clean-up or other remedial costs does,.not fall within the
Bankruptcy Code and is not dischargeable. Conversely, governmental clean-up followed
by an assessment of costs is subject to discharge. Id. at 523.
1991]
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it is deemed pecuniary under Whizco. Early enforcement actions will
become crucial.
With the foregoing in mind, the wisest course for the EPA may
be to order abatement under CERCLA section 106. As long as the
obligation is considered nonmonetary, it is nondischargeable. Even so,
the court will look to substance over form and is likely to find a
dischargeable monetary obligation where the debtor, as in Whizco,
cannot fulfill the obligation personally, either because he lacks unen-
cumbered assets or because a receiver has been appointed under state
law.
Finally, if environmental obligations are to remain immutable inside
of bankruptcy, legislative action is needed.2 1 Exemption of environ-
mental obligations from discharge would eliminate the inequities caused
when firms utilize funds that could be earmarked for environmental
compliance for internal matters.116 Prohibiting discharge in a Chapter
7 case and requiring the inclusion and prompt payment of environmental
obligations in a Chapter 11 plan would prompt potential debtors to
reconsider their strategy. If bankruptcy will not provide an escape from
liability, and since creditors may incur joint and several liability under
CERCLA, the no-discharge provision will a) eliminate any pecuniary
advantage in bankruptcy, and b) cause creditors to monitor debtors'
compliance. 1' 7 Admittedly, the no-discharge policy would preclude debt-
ors from escaping liability. Whether or not one views this result as
desirable again depends on one's views regarding the proper role of
bankruptcy. Present legislative exceptions for dischargeability of the
debts of an individual debtor reflect societal policy that certain debts,
including certain taxes, frauds, alimony, willful and malicious injuries,
and fines and penalties 218 should remain immutable in bankruptcy.
Societal views concerning environmental obligations have changed since
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Perhaps now is the
appropriate time to urge legislative action.
V. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: A CONCLUSION
Although the judiciary has struggled mightily to resolve the conflict
between the policies embodied in the Bankruptcy Code, CERCLA, and
215. "Whether the obligations involved are subject to discharge should not depend
on who is in control of the debtor's property or whether the site poses a present and
ongoing threat to public health and safety. Clearly defined statutes should resolve conflicts
so that all interested parties can predict the outcome prior to a bankruptcy proceeding."
Note, supra note 204, at 227.
See also United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147, 151 n.5. (Congress could easily exempt
environmental obligations from discharge.).
216. See generally Note, supra note 204, at 225.
217. Id.
218. See generally II U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
[Vol. 52
COMMENT
state environmental statutes, the results have been less than satisfactory.
If one agrees bankruptcy's primary role is procedural and that all
substantive rights in bankruptcy should be governed by the applicable
federal and state regulations operative outside bankruptcy, a solution
is clearly needed.
Thus far, what reconciliation has occurred has been at the price
of impairment of one of the competing interests. Moreover, in some
cases "reconciliation" has resulted in the frustration of both the policies
of the Bankruptcy Code and those of CERCLA, inconsistent rulings,
and a resultant decline in ability of the parties (the debtor and the
EPA) to develop effective strategies for the future.
The power to provide a solution lies with Congress. Only by amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code, and to a lesser degree, CERCLA, can
this problem be resolved. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code should
prohibit abandonment of property unless there is substantial compliance
with environmental regulations. An amendment to the automatic stay
would render that provision inapplicable to all actions undertaken pur-
suant to CERCLA and state environmental statutes up to and including
the entry of a money judgment. Reasonable costs expended in com-
pliance with CERCLA and state obligations would receive an admin-
istrative expense priority. Finally, environmental obligations should be
deemed nondischargeable. In tandem with these amendments, CERCLA
must be amended to grant the government a superlien for the amount
by which the clean-up has benefitted the property.
During the interim, the judiciary has tools available to construe
existing statutory provisions to best effectuate the public policy em-
bodied in CERCLA and state environmental laws. First, the bankruptcy
judge should utilize his power of dismissal of the petition under Bank-
ruptcy Code section 305219 where the government can show that the
bankruptcy process is being abused. Because a Chapter 7 case may be
dismissed under section 707(2) "only after notice and hearing and only
for cause," 2 0 the parties may have the opportunity and the incentive
to reach amicable resolution of environmental obligations outside bank-
ruptcy. The same result may be obtained in a Chapter I I case under
11 12(b). 2 1' A second avenue available to the bankruptcy judge is Bank-
219. I1 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (1988) states that after notice and a hearing, the judge
may dismiss the case, or suspend all proceedings, if "the interests of the creditors and
the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension."
220. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1988). The section then sets forth an illustrative list. See
In re Commercial Oil Serv. Inc., 58 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986), where the
court refused to dismiss the voluntary Chapter 7 case.
221. i U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1988) provides, in pertinent part, that the court may dismiss
a case if it is "in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause." An illustrative
list follows.
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ruptcy Code section 105.n2 Whether or not the bankruptcy stay provision
is amended as suggested, the bankruptcy court will continue to have
the power to stay environmental obligations in exceptional circum-
stances. It is acknowledged that because CERCLA's objectives may not
outweigh all interests in all cases, such flexibility is needed. Third, the
court may invoke 28 U.S.C. section 959 to require the trustee, including
a debtor in possession, to manage and operate property in his possession
in compliance with state environmental laws. "'3 Finally, the bankruptcy
court may subordinate a claim for purposes of distribution under the
doctrine of equitable subordination contained in Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion .510.24 The government's claim will benefit from the change in
priority.
The conflict between environmental regulations and bankruptcy pol-
icy is essentially one over loss distribution. CERCLA assesses liability
on PRPs regardless of their ability to pay and thus protects the public
and Superfund. The Bankruptcy Code establishes an orderly prioriti-
zation schedule of payment that distinguishes creditors based only on
the type, but not the content, of the claim. The issue then is not only
who gets a piece of the pie, but how one determines the number and
size of the slices. As long as bankruptcy offers a respite from envi-
ronmental obligations, the conflict will remain unresolved. Legislative
reconciliation, and in the interim judicial discretion, is needed to create
some harmony out of what is at present a source of discord.
Jill Thompson Losch
222. "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." II U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988) provides, "(A] trustee ... appointed in any cause
pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage
and operate the property in his possession as such trustee ... according to the valid
laws of the State in which the property is situated, in the same manner that the owner
or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof." See also Midatlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1985).
224. II U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1988) states in pertinent part that after notice and a
hearing, the court may "under principles of equitable subordination subordinate for
purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest."
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